EVENTS

The distinction between “convivial” and “monopolistic” technologies, introduced in the 1970s by the philosopher Ivan Illich, was the foundation for a radical critique of contemporary technological society (Illich 1973). This key distinction was adopted in a critique of technology and economic reason (Gorz 1988) by French critical phenomenology (avant la lettre).
This talk will focus on how this distinction between convivial and monopolistic (or non-convivial) technologies can support a critical phenomenology of technology. I will argue that Gorz attempts to do just this, but that his development of the “convivial – un-convivial” distinction in terms of a broader account of “autonomy” vs “heteronomy” would benefit from a more phenomenologically grounded account of autonomy. I will pose (and try to address) the question of whether a more embodied account of autonomy, such as developed within the context of enactive approaches to cognition would serve such an aim.
A third step will be to ask if and how an enactively enriched notion of autonomy, when situated within the critique of technology and economic rationality, can contribute to the development of programmes for “concrete utopias”.